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Abstract
This paper bridges a historiographical gap in accounts of the prediction and
discovery of the positron by combining three ingredients. First, the prediction
and discovery of the positron are situated in the broader context of a period of
‘crystallisation’ of a research tradition. Second, the prediction and discovery
of the positron are discussed in the context of the ‘authentication’ of the
particle. Third, the attitude of the relevant scientists to both prediction and
discovery are conceptualised in terms of the idea of ‘perspectives’. It will be
argued that by examining the prediction and discovery of the positron in the
context of authentication within a period of crystallisation, we can better
understand disagreements regarding the positron between relevant scientists
(Dirac, Bohr, and Pauli) in the period 1931-34.
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1. Introduction
The Solvay Conference of 1933 marks the recognition of the positron as
a new particle of matter. However, the discussions during the conference
brought out prior disagreements with regard to the nature of the positron.
Whilst the historical details of the prediction and discovery of the positron
have already been subject to a reasonably complete existing literature [1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6], important questions related to the disagreements attending the
nature of the positron remain nevertheless puzzling. In particular: Why were
Bohr and Pauli so opposed to equating the experimental particle with the
Dirac-particle? Were their seemingly mysterious attitudes born of dogmatic
conservatism? What factors led to their eventual change of heart?
This paper bridges a historiographical gap by offering a novel combina-
tion of three ingredients. First, the prediction and discovery of the positron
are situated in the broader context of a period of ‘crystallisation’ of a re-
search tradition. Second, the prediction and discovery of the positron are
discussed in the context of the ‘authentication’ of the particle. Third, the
epistemic attitudes of the relevant scientists are conceptualised in terms of
the idea of ‘perspectives’. Crystallisation leads physicists to reevaluate core
assumptions. In this context, scientists with different epistemic perspectives
may respond differentially to the same empirical knowledge, this in turn may
serve to impede any process of authentication. In this paper it will be shown
that examining the prediction and discovery of the positron in the context of
authentication within a period crystallisation can help explain the mystify-
ing attitudes of certain physicists both prior and throughout the 7th Solvay
Conference, particularly the epistemic attitudes of Bohr and Pauli.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the
necessary conceptual background is briefly summarised. Section 3 gives an
overview of the relevant historical context of the crystallisation of a research
tradition. Section 4 details Dirac’s prediction and the disagreements that
ensued. In section 5 the perspectives of Pauli and Bohr are evaluated, and in
Section 6 the process of the authentication of the positron is considered.
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2. Conceptual Background
Following Laudan [7], a research tradition can be understood as “the set
of assumptions ... about the basic kinds of entities in the world, assump-
tions about the proper methods to use for constructing and testing theories
about those entities” (p. 97), in brief, “a set of ontological and methodolog-
ical ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’”(p. 80). Research traditions foster a variety of differ-
ent theories which normally inherit the set of assumptions of their parent
research tradition. Crystallisation marks the early stages of a research tradi-
tion in which a wealth of conceptual and empirical problems are still in need
of resolution. Empirical problems concern empirical phenomena in need of
explanation, whilst conceptual problems are due to inconsistencies between
the theories fostered by the research tradition. The paradigmatic example of
crystallisation is quantum theory in the early 20th century (1900 -1925), see
for example [8]. Authentication then refers to the validation of a particular
empirical phenomena as a well established, genuine, empirical effect. Unlike
Laudan, in this paper authentication is not restricted to the validation of
experimental results, of which, in the case of the positron there already ex-
ists a vast literature ([4, 5, 6], etc.). Whilst the experimental authentication
of the positron is instrumental to the confirmation of the positron as a new
particle of matter, the focus here is on the theoretical authentication which
was equally instrumental to its proper recognition.
Physicists’ epistemic attitudes can be described in terms of ‘perspectives’.
A perspective can be understood as a sophisticated theoretical framework that
encompasses the set of theoretical interests and background theoretical knowl-
edge (principles and assumptions equally) that a researcher or group of re-
searchers can be said to hold at any given time. A perspective represents the
working stance of a scientist. Perspectives are conceptual bookkeeping tools
for tracking relevant epistemic shifts in scientists’ attitudes towards a given
conceptual or empirical problem. The notion of perspective, as used here, does
not encompass personal, idiosyncratic likes or dislikes of the relevant scien-
tists. Thus perspectives, insofar as they can be reconstructed from primary
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and secondary historical sources, reflect the epistemic or theoretical attitude
of a scientist, and not their subjective, idiosyncratic attitude towards a given
problem. Tracking a scientist’s perspective can be particularly useful in cases
where the solution to a particular conceptual or empirical problem is un-
der discussion and disagreement ensues. In particular, tracking any relevant
shifts in a scientist’s perspective may help one understand the nature of the
disagreement and thus lead to its resolution. Similarly to Laudan’s theories,
perspectives inherit the theoretical assumptions of the research tradition. It
is further worth noting that the notion of perspectives used here is differ-
ent from the notion of perspective as defined by perspectival realists such as
Massimi or Giere. Massimi [9, 10] takes perspectives to encompass both “(i)
the body of scientific knowledge claims advanced by a scientific community
at the time; (ii) the experimental, theoretical, and technological resources
available to the scientific community at the time to reliably make those sci-
entific knowledge claims; and (iii) second-order (methodological-epistemic)
claims that justify the scientific knowledge claims advanced”, and thus her
notion of ‘perspective’ is closer to Laudan’s research tradition. In contrast
to Massimi’s notion, ‘perspective’ as defined here is more localised, yet not
as localised as Giere’s ([11, 12]) perspectives. For Giere, a perspective is a
‘theoretical’ or ‘observational’ viewpoint afforded by a theory, whereas on the
view advanced here perspectives can encompass elements of different theories
at the same time.
In periods of crystallisation, perspectives can deviate from the core as-
sumptions of a research tradition and can affect the authentication of certain
phenomena. Crystallisation, being characterised by both unsolved conceptual
and empirical problems, and sometimes, by rapid discoveries, can deepen and
diversify the reevaluation of core assumptions according to the theoretical in-
terests of a particular scientist. Thus, scientists with different perspectives
may respond differentially to the same empirical knowledge, hence impeding
authentication. In the remainder of this paper it will be argued that once
examined against the background of crystallisation, the perspectives of Bohr
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and Pauli towards the authentication of the positron are no longer puzzling.
3. Crystallisation
The basic argument put forward in this paper is that crystallisation leads
physicists to reevaluate core assumptions. In this context, scientists with dif-
ferent perspectives may respond differentially to the same empirical knowl-
edge, and this in turn may serve to impede any process of authentication. Fur-
thermore, disputes regarding authentication within crystallisation can lead
to productive forms of disagreement.2 Once understood against the back-
ground of crystallisation, the puzzling perspectives of scientists in regard to
the authentication of an empirical phenomena stop having a mystifying char-
acter. The first step in establishing the basic argument of this paper is to
put forward evidence of crystallisation. Thus, this section will provide a brief
account of the main assumptions and of the main conceptual and empirical
problems of the early 1930s.
Up until the discovery of the neutron in 1932,3 most physicists thought
that there exist only two kinds of fundamental particles: the proton and the
electron. As a consequence of this, most physicists believed that the atomic
nucleus was made of protons and electrons (see [15, 17]). However, the con-
finement of electrons inside the nucleus led to a wealth of problems concerning
the stability of nuclei, their spin, and their statistics.4 In addition to troubles
with the structure of the nucleus, the continuous spectrum of β-decay was
still in need of explanation.5 Some of these difficulties seemed so great that
2Here, we follow [13], who introduce the idea of ‘productive disagreement’ to describe
situations in which, in the absence of new decisive evidence, scientists are better off main-
taining disagreement, as “maintaining epistemic peer disagreement is valuable for further-
ing epistemic goals” (p. 170).
3Chadwick’s letter to Nature announcing the discovery of the neutron was published
on February 27 1932, see [14]. For historical accounts of the neutron discovery and ensuing
controversies see [15], and [16].
4For a description of the nuclear paradoxes see [18], pp. 330-332.
5For details regarding the β-decay controversy see [19], [15], [20], [21], and [16].
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a breakdown of quantum mechanics at the nuclear level was not considered
out of the question (see [2], p. 228). Thus before the discovery of new par-
ticles, physicists struggled to apply the new quantum mechanics to nuclear
phenomena and physicists such as Bohr, for example, called into question
core assumptions of the research tradition (e.g. the energy conservation prin-
ciple).6 Whilst in 1932 new particles were discovered, these new discoveries
did not immediately lead to solutions to the aforementioned problems.7 Some
of the particles were accepted more readily than others, for example the neu-
tron,8 whilst in other cases, such as the positron’s, their discovery marked the
beginning of a long process of authentication. It is against this background –
which can be understood as a period of crystallisation of a research tradition
– that the prediction of the positron was made and its authentication begun.
A major turn in relativistic quantum mechanics took place with Dirac’s
derivation of his relativistic equation of the electron ([25]).9 A range of spec-
troscopic anomalies, such as the Zeeman effect, were explained by introducing
spin10, yet neither spin nor relativity were yet integrated in quantum mechan-
ics ([30], p. 44). With Dirac’s equation, “spin was a necessary consequence,
the correct magnetic moment of the electron was obtained, the anomalous
Zeeman effect of atoms came out right, the Thomas factor of the electron ap-
peared automatically” ([33], p. 95). Despite these spectacular results, Dirac’s
theory of the electron had also some undesirable consequences.11 The equa-
6Bohr’s ‘attack’ of the energy conservation principle is well known and has been dis-
cussed in a variety of papers, most recently by [22]and [19]; it will also be the subject of
more detailed discussion in what follows.
7For a review of the ‘new particles’ in the 1930, see [17], ch. 7, [23], ch. 5, and [24].
8This is not to say that the authentication of the neutron proceeded in an entirely
uncontroversial manner, but whilst its nature was debated, its existence was accepted
almost immediately.
9For Dirac’s own recollections on the origin of the equation see [26, 27, 28]. For reviews
on the origins of Dirac’s equation see [29] and [30].
10For an early history of the Spin-Statistics Theorem see [31] and [32].
11For example, Moyer [34] notes that “ Two metaphors – magic and sickness – recur in
recollections of early reactions to Dirac’s theory. Oppenheimer, for example, used both in
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tion had four solutions: two of the solutions referred to free electrons, i.e.,
electrons with negative charge, and two solutions referred to electrons with
negative energy, i.e., electrons with positive charge – which could not at the
time be given any physical interpretation.12 Whilst the negative energy so-
lutions were not a new theoretical concept, as they beset the Klein-Gordon
equation as well, the negative energy problem had not been carefully studied
in relation to the Klein-Gordon equation because this equation was con-
sidered theoretically problematic (it had no one-particle interpretation) and
empirically inadequate (it did not give the hydrogen fine structure).13 But
since the Dirac equation gave such spectacular results, the negative solutions
couldn’t be ignored, at least not indefinitely.
Dirac himself initially chose to ignore the negative solutions,14 but in light
of the Klein paradox and the Klein-Nishina formula,15 some explanation of
the difficulty of electrons having negative kinetic energy (henceforth the ‘±
difficulty’) had to be found. However, since the negative energy solutions
were not believed to be a real phenomena, there was no easy way to provide
a satisfactory explanation to the ‘± difficulty’. Thus whilst not being an
immediate consequence of Dirac’s relativistic equation of the electron, it is
the ‘± difficulty’ that led, by degrees, to the prediction of the positron.16
close juxtaposition. The theory magically yielded properties of the electron from general
formal considerations. But the theory was also afflicted with the sickness of predicting
properties not observed” (p. 1056).
12“Only half of the solutions to the Dirac equation for an interacting electron refer to
the particle’s negative charge; the other half can be shown to refer to a particle of positive
charge” ([3], p. 88).
13Thanks to Alexander Blum for pointing out some of the problems related to the Klein-
Gordon equation.
14“Since half the solutions must be rejected as referring to the charge + e on the electron,
the correct number will be left to account for duplexity phenomena” [25], p. 618.
15Klein’s paradox showed that “in some simple cases the Dirac electron would behave
in a patently absurd way” ([3], p. 89), whilst the Klein-Nishina scattering formula “relied
crucially on positive as well as negative energies” ([3], p. 89).
16Contrary to a naive account, the positron is not an immediate consequence of Dirac’s
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Dirac’s equation, though providing a range of excellent results, added to
the problem of crystallisation. The ‘± difficulty’ and a bit later the ‘hole the-
ory’ called into question core symmetry and conservation assumptions, thus
exacerbating the need for reevaluation. In the next section it will therefore
prove instructive to trace the sequence of events that led Dirac from initially
dismissing the ‘± difficulty’ to the ‘hole’ theory for at least two reasons.
First, because Dirac’s theoretical prediction of the positron marks the first
step in its authentication and also leads to further reevaluation of certain
core assumptions. Second, because the prediction of the positron and reac-
tions thereto constitute further evidence of crystallisation and of its effects
on authentication.
4. Pre-Authentication
Dirac’s first attempt to solve the “± difficulty” was not only an attempt
to overcome the Klein paradox; it was also prompted by a letter from Niels
Bohr who foreshadowed more stringent problems arising from the application
of Dirac’s equation to “nuclear electrons”.17 Bohr alluded to the possibility
that the “± difficulty” “might be said to reveal a contrast between the claims
of conservation of energy and momentum on one side and the conservation
of the individual particles on the other side” ([35], p. 547). Dirac’s response
took the form of his first articulation of the ‘hole’ theory. The hole theory
assumes that there is an infinite sea of negative electrons, in which “most
stable states are occupied [...] except perhaps a few of small velocity” ([36],
p. 362). The unoccupied states or the holes were initially identified by Dirac
with protons [35], p. 549). Herman Weyl, also, independently showed that
the negative energy solutions could be explained away by interpreting “the
equation. In fact, Pashby notes that “The presence of negative energy solutions was not
enough to predict anti-matter: each of the negative energy states had to be occupied by an
electron for ‘anti-electrons’ (holes) to have physically reasonable properties, and moreover
properties which in detail turned out to be instantiated by the positron” (p. 462).
17See [5], [3], and [2] for details.
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four differential equations as including the proton in addition to the electron”
([37], p. 225), only to later dismiss this idea and conclusively show that holes
could not be protons. Weyl showed that the mass of electrons and holes is
the same18, a conclusion supported also by Tamm and Oppenheimer ([38], p.
101). However, in between the two stages of Weyl’s proofs, Dirac showed why
the immediate identification of a ‘hole’ with the proton a` la Weyl (i.e., the
early proof) was afflicted by a number of problems which Dirac’s ([36, 39])
more elevated proof of why the ‘holes’ should be identified with the protons
seemed to eschew.
The straightforward assertion “that a negative-energy electron is a pro-
ton” generated, according to Dirac, paradoxes related to the conservation
of electric charge, conservation of momentum, and concerns with regard to
the physical reality of a negative electron ([36, 39]). The problematic nature
of the negative-energy electron, and hence its immediate identification with
the proton, consisted in the fact that it would have “less energy the faster it
moves and it will have to absorb energy in order to be brought to rest” ([36],
p. 362) and it would be difficult to understand how such a particle could
ever be observed in nature. Finding a way around these difficulties whilst ac-
counting for the conditions in which the “unwanted solutions with negative
kinetic energy for the electron”19 could hold in the actual world, led Dirac to
further articulate his ‘hole theory’ and ingeniously explain why it would seem
that the proton is the ideal candidate for a hole. Dirac subsequently thought
that the hole theory went beyond the purely mathematical considerations
that led Weyl to associate the negative energy electrons with the protons.
The hole theory showed how “the states corresponding to a negative energy”
can have “some physical meaning”([39]). Based on the assumption that all
the states of negative energy for an electron are occupied, together with the
fact that “an electron with negative energy moves in an electromagnetic field
18See [5] for more details. See also [37].
19See [36], p. 360.
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in the same way as an ordinary electron with positive energy would move if
its charge were reversed in sign, so as to be +e instead of -e” ([39]), as well
as consideration of Pauli’s exclusion principle, Dirac was led to “assert that
the hole is a proton”([39]).
The identification of ‘holes’ with protons did not, however, alleviate many,
if any, of the initial concerns regarding the “± difficulty”. On the contrary,
it immediately led to further difficulties (e.g. symmetry violations 20) which
brought about an increasing dislike of the hole theory. In fact:
In its first two years Dirac’s hole theory was certainly not as
popular as Dirac’s equation. It was flatly rejected by Bohr, who
maintained his view that the negative energy difficulty announced
a breakdown of fundamental concepts, and, in spite of a short
period of interest, it was mocked by Pauli ([2], p. 238).
The difficulties introduced by the proton hypothesis were mainly due to
the mass asymmetry between the electron and the proton. The mass asym-
metry, however, was not the only problem introduced by the hole theory. The
identification of ‘holes’ with protons would also lead to “paradoxes regarding
conservation of charge, momentum, and energy” ([34], p. 1058) as well as
potential violations to the known stability of matter. Moreover, considera-
tions regarding the physical meaning of ‘spin’ would lead some (e.g. Bohr)
to believe that the negative-energy solutions show a breakdown of various
concepts at the quantum-relativistic level. In particular, Bohr was worried
that the “property called ‘spin’ could not be interpreted because there was
no corresponding classical property” ([34], p. 1058). Fortunately, the ‘pro-
ton’ hypothesis was short-lived: in 1931 Dirac identified the hole with a new
kind of particle that should have the same mass as the electron but positive
charge: the anti-electron (i.e., the positron):
20“[...] the Dirac wave equation is symmetric with respect to negative and positive
charges (electrons and anti-electrons), while nature shows no symmetry between the elec-
tron and the much heavier proton” ([3], p. 96).
10
A hole, if there were one, would be a new kind of particle, un-
known to experimental physics, having the same mass and oppo-
site charge to an electron. We may call such a particle an anti-
electron. We would not expect to find any of them in nature,
on account of their rapid rate of recombination with electrons,
but if they could be produced experimentally in high vacuum
they would be quite stable and amenable to observation. An en-
counter between two hard γ-rays (of energy at least half a million
volts) could lead to the creation simultaneously of an electron
and anti-electron, the probability of occurrence of this process
being of the same order of magnitude as that of the collision of
two γ-rays on the assumption that they are spheres of the same
size as classical electrons. This probability is negligible, however,
with the intensities of γ-rays at present available. The protons
on the above view are quite unconnected with electrons. Presum-
ably the protons will have their own negative-energy states, all of
which normally are occupied, an unoccupied one appearing as an
anti-proton. Theory at present is quite unable to suggest a rea-
son why there should be any differences between electrons and
protons ([40], pp. 61 – 62).
Dirac’s theoretical prediction of the anti-electron is unanimously recog-
nised by physicists, historians of science, and philosophers ([41], [1], [42], [43],
[44], [5]) as the bone fide prediction of the positron. However, at the time of
the prediction, no experiments were yet conducted to search for the anti-
electron or positron, and Dirac’s theory was neither well received, nor was
the association between the subsequent experimental results immediately as-
sociated with it. In fact, it would take a long time for Dirac’s prediction to be
taken seriously. For example, Heilbron recollects of his interview with P.M.S.
Blackett that “[w]hen asked how long they had known about Dirac’s theory,
Blackett replied he wasn’t quite certain, but that it didn’t matter anyway
because nobody took Dirac’s theory seriously” ([45]). Also, Chadwick, in an
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interview with Wiener, recollects that “not a great deal of notice was taken at
once about this hole or positive electron – not a great deal, not until a year or
two later” ([46]). Though it is hardly controversial to claim that the authen-
tication of the positron started with its theoretical prediction, recollections
such as Chadwick’s and Blackett’s suggest that the theoretical aspect of the
authentication hindered, rather than helped the recognition of the positron
as a new particle of matter. Even when Anderson’s experiments were put
forward, few if any associated the experimental evidence with Dirac’s predic-
tion.21 It wasn’t until Blackett and Occhialini’s experimental results were put
forward that Dirac’s theoretical prediction started to be taken more seriously.
However, Blackett and Occhialini’s experiments led neither to the immediate
recognition of the positron as a new particle of matter nor to the confirma-
tion of Dirac’s theory. Their experiments, though received with enthusiasm
by some,22 led others to express a deep opposition towards the experimental
particle, and an even stronger opposition to the equation of the experimental
particle with the Dirac particle.
Though Dirac himself has suggested that experimentalists did not see the
‘positron’ due to ‘prejudice’, and that it was also ‘prejudice’ that led Bohr,
Pauli, and others to oppose the positron,23 there are reasons to resist this ex-
21Rosenfeld, in an interview with Oskar Klein, notes that “[there was a very strong
resistance in Copenhagen, from Bohr, when the announcement of the positive electron
came. Bohr would not believe it; he would not believe it. He did not make, and nobody
here made the connection with Dirac’s theory. I think somebody may have mentioned
Dirac theory, and then Bohr dismissed it by saying, ‘Oh, but that is no theory. That is
not a theory that one can believe in’” [47].
22“I got used to say, that your prediction of the antielectron has no parallel in the history
of science. [...] Your theoretical prediction about the existence of the antielectron, being
unstable in the ‘ordinary space’ outside the nucleus, seemed so extravagant and totally
new, that you yourself dared not cling to it and preferred rather to abandon the theory.
And now the experiment unexpectedly proved you to be right ...” ([48], p. 64).
23“Many of the developments which have been occurring in recent times have been
concerned with the introduction of new particles. There again we see that the physicist had
to overcome a prejudice. Up until about 1930 physicists thought that there were only two
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planation. Bohr and Pauli were not completely opposed to new particles since
they already accepted the neutron as a new particle of matter.24 Moreover,
Bohr was ready to part with the laws of conservation, an attitude anything
but conservative; whilst Pauli himself entertained the possibility of the ex-
istence of a new particle, i.e., the neutrino, again an attitude that does not
exude prejudice. Thus explaining the opposition of Bohr and Pauli towards
the positron in terms of dogmatic conservatism, cannot be the whole story.
It is more likely that due to the effects of crystallisation Pauli’s and Bohr’s
opposition to the authentication of the positron ought to be sought in the
effect of the positron on their working perspectives.
It has so far been shown that the prediction and discovery of the positron
took place against the background of crystallisation. Despite three separate
events suggesting the existence of the positron – i.e., Dirac’s theoretical pre-
diction, Anderson’s discovery, Blackett’ and Occhialini’s confirmatory exper-
iments – this new particle was not fully authenticated till the 7th Solvay
Conference of 1933. Whilst the existing historical and philosophical litera-
ture provides a good deal of evidence for the existence of disagreements in
connection to the confirmation of the positron as a new particle of matter, a
definitive diagnosis of the causes of these disagreements has yet to be estab-
lished.
Hanson, for example, argues that “the discovery of the positive electron
was a discovery of three different particles” ([1], p. 194). Whilst his anal-
ysis provides insight into The Anderson Particle, The Dirac Particle, and
The Blackett-Occhialini Particle, Hanson does not offer any definitive pro-
nouncement with regard to what led to the equation of the Dirac particle
fundamental particles, the electron and the proton. [...] There was very strong reluctance
to postulate new particles up until about that time. [...] Why did experimentalists not see
them? Because they were prejudiced against them” ([27], pp. 12 -13).
24Note that though the neutron’s discovery did prompt a certain amount of disagreement
regarding its nature, the recognition of the neutron as a genuine empirical phenomena,
i.e., its authentication, preceded such disagreement.
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with the experimental particle. In addition to Hanson’s three particles, Dar-
rigol [2], and in passing Roque´ [4], draw attention to a fourth particle with
positive charge, mass similar to the electron’s, but of integer spin, i.e., the
Bose-positron. This was an interpretative hypothesis emerging on the back of
Anderson’s experiments, which albeit short lived was for some time regarded
as a possible solution to some of the conceptual and empirical problems of the
early 1930’s. Darrigol draws attention to the disagreement regarding the in-
terpretation of the experimental results and highlights the fact that a number
of physicists were reluctant to equate the experimentally discovered particle
(i.e., Anderson’s positive electron) with the theoretically ‘discovered’ particle
(i.e., Dirac’s anti-electron).25
Roque´, in an insightful account of how the positron was established as a
new particle, calls attention to a deeper disagreement regarding the status of
cosmic rays experiments, which were used to obtain the famous photographs
of positron tracks published by Anderson in 1932. According to Roque´, se-
rious doubt was entertained with regard to “the evidential weight of exper-
iments involving cosmic rays” ([4], p. 85), urging researchers to find means
of producing “positive electrons by means of radioactive sources, rather than
undependable cosmic rays” (ibid., p. 88). Roque´ thus argues that it was the
successful ‘manufacture’ that resolved the disagreements.
Finally, Pashby [5], in an incisive paper on Dirac’s prediction of the
positron, provides additional reasons for concern regarding the debate over
the theoretical identity of the positron. Whilst forcefully arguing that Dirac’s
prediction of the positron ought to be seen as a bone fide theoretical predic-
tion, and hardly anyone would deny this, he also points out that “in the
conceptual framework of the hole theory, there could be no antimatter with-
out the Dirac sea’ ([5], p. 462), and hence no positron either. Pashby thus
emphasises the importance of the theoretical side of the debate regarding the
identity of the positron.
25See Darrigol’s quote on p. 5.
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The existing literature notwithstanding, a diagnosis of the disagreements
has yet to be established. What we suggest is that the disagreements re-
garding the positron are less mystifying if they are understood in the con-
text of authentication within crystallisation. Crystallisation leads physicists
to reevaluate core assumptions and this reevaluation, in turn, can impede
authentication. Thus whilst Roque´ is right to suggest that the slow authen-
tication of the positron can be attributed to the need of “manufacturing
positrons”, this can only be a partial diagnosis. To account for the theoret-
ical disagreements, the resistance on the part of leading physicists such as
Pauli and Bohr to the identification of the experimental particle with the
Dirac particle must be accounted for. In the following section, it will be
argued that their attitudes can be shown to be neither dogmatic nor mys-
terious, provided that they are understood in the context of authentication
within crystallisation.
5. Perspectives
Throughout 1933 leading physicists such as Bohr and Pauli were sceptical
of the experiments involving positrons and opposed the identification of the
experimental particle with Dirac’s theoretical prediction. Barring dogmatic
conservatism, their attitudes are strikingly puzzling. Why did they oppose
so vehemently and for such a long time the identification of the experimental
particle with Dirac’s prediction? This section is dedicated to an examination
of Pauli’s and Bohr’s respective perspectives from which a richer explanation
of their attitudes towards the positron is to be established. However, before
we examine in more detail Bohr’s and Pauli’ perspectives, a few clarifications
on perspectives themselves are in order.
It is useful to examine a scientists’ epistemic attitude towards a particular
conceptual or empirical problem by first understanding their ‘perspective’.
The perspective of a scientist encompasses both their theoretical interests
and their background theoretical knowledge. First, in regard to interests, it
is worth emphasising that scientists can, at any given point, apply themselves
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to a number of different conceptual or empirical problems. Second, in regard
to background theoretical knowledge, it is useful to note that in attempting
to resolve any conceptual or empirical problem, scientists will have at their
disposal the background assumptions of the research tradition, as well as less
entrenched and less general assumptions pertaining to the relevant solutions
they’re working on in relation to the problems they apply themselves to. It is
worth reemphasising that the notion of perspective used here is an epistemic
one, referring to a scientists’s theoretical stance and not to their subjective,
or idiosyncratic attitude. A scientists’ perspective, particularly in periods of
crystallisation, may lead them to respond differentially to the same empirical
knowledge. By examining Bohr’s and Pauli’s perspective within the context
of crystallisation it will be shown that their attitudes are neither dogmatically
conservative nor mysterious.
5.1. Bohr’s Perspective
Bohr belonged to the class of scientists who have a wide appreciation
and understanding of the problems concerning the entire field to which they
belong to, not counting a range of adjacent (i.e., pertaining to other sciences,
particularly chemistry and biology) and non-adjacent problems (i.e., social,
cultural, etc.).26 Through his visitors at the Copenhagen institute, through
his correspondence, and through academic journals, Bohr liked to keep track
of developments in physics and other sciences, even though such develop-
ments may not have been strictly relevant to his own research interests.27 As
regards his research interests, they were as varied as his intellectual reach.
This notwithstanding, it is plausible to suggest that in the early ’30s he was
26Insightful remarks regarding Bohr’s intellectual preoccupations can be gleaned from
Thomas Kuhn’s, Aage Bohr’s, and Leon Rosenfeld’s interview with Margrethe Bohr, which
can be found in the AIP Archives, see [49].
27John Hendry takes this to be the typical attitude of most physicists of the time,
claiming that “[even though they may have published only within restricted areas, most
physicists took their perception of the problem complex from the wider field of their
reading, correspondence and conversation” ([50], p. 6).
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primarily interested in the structure of the atomic nucleus and the β-decay
puzzles.28 His interest in these problems did not stop him from suggesting
solutions to related problems, though, as it will become apparent below, solu-
tions to adjacent problems were inevitably assessed by their possible import
to the main problems he was interested in.
Having heard from Gamow about the ‘± difficulty’, Bohr wrote to Dirac
to ask for details, confessing that he is interested in this problem in connec-
tion to the β-decay problem, particularly “as regards conservation of energy
in β-ray disintegration and the interior of stars” ([35], p. 547). In the same
letter, he also suggested that just as in nuclear problems, “an essential lim-
itation of the principles of conservation of energy and momentum” (p. 548)
might have to be faced, a departure from these principles might also be of
use in solving the ‘± difficulty’. Dirac, as we know, resisted this suggestion
and in his letter to Bohr made it plain that he prefers “to keep rigorous con-
servation of energy at all costs and would rather abandon even the concept
of matter consisting of separate atoms and electrons than the conservation
of energy”.29 The conservation of energy principle “had been in the history
of physics an ever trustworthy guide” [2], yet, as Helge Kragh writes, “[in]
the light of experimental anomalies and conceptual difficulties related to rel-
ativistic quantum mechanics [Bohr] foresaw a drastic revision of fundamental
physics, with strict energy conservation being one of the necessary sacrifices”
([22], p. 126). We can already see that crystallisation invited the reevalua-
tion of core assumptions such as the conservation of energy principle, yet
against the background of crystallisation, Bohr’s attitude is very far from
being dogmatically conservative.
28Victor Weisskopf, for example, writes that Niels Bohr’s work “can be divided into four
periods”, where “[t]he third period, 1930-1940, was devoted to the application of the new
quantum concepts to electromagnetic phenomena and the exploration of the structure of
the nucleus” ([51], pp. 584-585).
29Dirac’s remark is cited in [3], p. 90 and the full letter can be found in [35], p. 548 -
550).
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Bohr was coming to the problem of the negative energy solutions, via a
perspective different from Dirac’s and was more concerned with how Dirac’s
equation might bear on nuclear electrons and the problem of β-decay, than
he was concerned with Dirac’s hole theory as such. Bohr returned to the ‘±
difficulty’ again and again, though on every occasion it was in connection to
either the structure of the nucleus or the problem of β-decay. Bohr continues
to ‘upset’ the energy conservation throughout the early ’30s and refers to this
possibility again in his 1933 Solvay report, restating that he only “advocated
that one seriously consider the idea of a possible failure of the theorems of
conservation of energy and momentum in connection with the continuous β-
ray spectra” and in order to “emphasise the total inadequacy of the classical
conceptual edifice for treating this problem” ([52], p. 191). It is clear from
Bohr’s remarks that the path of reevaluating core assumptions was not to be
excluded in a period of crystallisation.
Bohr’s attitude to developments in connection to the ‘± difficulty’ did
not change much throughout the early ‘30s since these developments were
not presenting any viable solutions to either the problem of β-decay or to
the structure of the nucleus. Dirac’s prediction of the positron was largely
ignored and it is plausible to suggest that insofar as Bohr is concerned his
doubts regarding the positron are due to the fact that this new particle did
not help resolve any of the problems he concerned himself with. His perspec-
tive, though different from Dirac’s, was shaped by different concerns and a
different, non-conservative attitude towards the reevaluation of background
assumptions.30 He continued to doubt Dirac’s positron even after Blackett
and Occhialini’s report confirmed Anderson’s findings and tentatively put
forward a connection between the experimental results and Dirac’s hole the-
30A similar point is made by John Hendry, who notes that “[t]he physicists concerned
with a particular set of problems did not share the same influences and concerns; each one
approached the current issues, both technical and philosophical, from a different frame-
work” ([50], p. 4).
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ory.31 In April 1933 he wrote the following to Oskar Klein:
Regarding the positive electrons I cannot, however, quite share
your enthusiasm. I am at least as yet very sceptical as regards
the interpretation of Blackett’s photographs, and am afraid that
it will take a long time before we can have any certain knowledge
about the existence or non-existence of the positive electrons. Nor
as regards the applicability of Dirac’s theory to this problem, I
feel certain, or more correctly, I doubt it, at least for the moment
(cited in [4], p. 76).32
Bohr continued to be suspicious of the identification of the experimental
particle with the Dirac particle throughout 1933. His attitude, far from be-
ing mysterious, was due to a number of factors that could not easily be put
into a consistent picture. First, he expected that the transition from “the
physics of the atoms to that of nuclei may involve the sacrifice of some fun-
damental principle, namely energy conservation” ([54], p. 214). Second, he
initially believed that Blackett’s and Occhialini’s photographs were ‘patho-
logical photographs’, a belief which, as Roque points out, was not unfounded,
since “Ire`ne Curie and Fre´de´ric Joliot had previously disregarded positively
curved tracks as experimental artefacts, and Millikan had dismissed Ander-
son’s original conclusions on the same grounds, prompting him to check on
turbulence” ([4], p. 85). Third, Blackett’s and Occhialini’s interpretation was
tied to Dirac’s hole theory, of which Bohr thought that it was “not a theory
that one can believe in”33 for a variety of reasons (i.e., formalism, mea-
31In a footnote to a letter to Peierls, dated May 22, 1933, Pauli reports that “[w]hen
I saw him in March, he [Bohr] absolutely rejected the positive electron and thought that
Blackett had just produced some ‘pathological photographs’” ([52], p. 468).
32Rudolf Peierls recollects the same attitude, noting that “[e]even after the discovery of
the positron, which behaved exactly as Dirac had predicted a hole would behave, Bohr
was cautious and urged that it should not be taken for granted that this was the right
interpretation of the new particle” ([53], p. 58).
33Bohr’s remark as reported by Rosenfled in his interview with Oskar Klein, see [47].
19
surement issues etc.). These different problems and assumptions shaped a
perspective which led Bohr to resist the authentication of the positron.
5.2. Pauli’s Perspective
The story of the positron cannot be told without an account of Pauli’s
reactions and views towards the events that shaped its authentication. Not
only because “everyone was eager to learn about Pauli’s always forcefully and
humorously expressed reactions to new discoveries and ideas, and his likes
and dislikes of the prospects opened” ([55], p. 3), but, more importantly, be-
cause Pauli was an outspoken critic of Dirac’s hole theory from the outset.34
He did not believe in Dirac’s prediction and he maintained an ambivalent
attitude towards the positron even after the discovery experiments were put
forward, writing to Blackett that he doesn’t “believe on the Dirac-‘holes’,
even if the positive electron exist” (sic)35 and to Dirac that he doesn’t be-
lieve in his “perception of ‘holes’, even if the existence of the ‘antielectron’
is proved”.36 Pauli’s attitude, however, is neither mystifying, nor dogmati-
cally conservative or due to prejudice. On the contrary, understood against
the background of crystallisation, Pauli’s attitude is, like Bohr’s, entirely
reasonable and explicable, as will be shown in what follows.
Pauli, like Bohr, liked to maintain a comprehensive view of the field. As
one of his assistants recalls, [o]ne of the remarkable things about Pauli, really
[...] is that he read everything. Everything!” ([57]). It is not surprising then
that the “negative energy states of the Dirac equation [...] intrigued Pauli
enormously” ([54], p. 221). The ‘± difficulty’ did not, however, interest Pauli
as much as other problems, such as the structure of the nucleus and the β-
34Massimi, for example, notes that “[s]ince its inception, Pauli had strongly opposed
Dirac’s hole picture as unphysical and counterintuitive, to the extent of welcoming El-
sasser’s hypothesis of the positron as an integral spin (or null spin) particle following
Bose-statistics instead of Fermi-Dirac statistsics” ([31], p. 133).
35Pauli, Letter to Blackett, 19 April 1933, [56], p. 158.
36Pauli, Letter to Dirac, 1 May 1933, [56], p. 159.
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decay problem.37 He applied himself to both of these problems by “adhering
to the already established laws of energy conservation and of quantised an-
gular momentum, making the necessary adjustments in the objects, namely
by proposing as working hypothesis the neutrino and the nuclear spin” ([54],
p. 228). Pauli’s attitude towards the new realm of the nucleus, was not like
Bohr’s that of abandoning well established laws. He thought instead that
“[w]ith nuclear processes, even almost more important than the conservation
laws of energy and momentum [...] are the conservation laws of all discreetly
quantised quantities”.38 Pauli preferred to “hold fast unconditionally to these
assumptions and to pursue them in their consequences”39 before modifying
them.40 In connection to the positron, the set of assumptions and problems of
which Pauli’s perspective consisted, played an important role in shaping his
attitude towards its authentication. We can see these connections, i.e., strong
adherence to entrenched background assumptions such as the conservation
and symmetry laws as well as a commitment to the neutrino hypothesis, re-
iterated in his personal correspondence throughout 1933. In May, he writes
the following to Peierls:
Furthermore, it is probable that the positive electron has integer
(perhaps zero) spin and Bose statistics. This could, however, be
deduced from the conservation laws (and from the empirical fact
that the mass number of nuclei uniquely determines their statis-
tics and the integer or half-integer character of their spin) only
if one knew that an uneven number of them can be created in
an elementary process. It would be desirable for experimenters to
determine precisely the elementary process in which the positive
37Darrigol, for example, notes that during the early ’30, Pauli “indulged too much in
nuclear electrons” ([2], p. 247).
38Quoted in [54], p. 228, full letter in [56], p. 184.
39Id.
40According to Enz, “Pauli was an unconditional believer in conservation laws” ([54], p.
254).
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electron is created. The idea that the positive electron obeys Bose
statistics first came to Elsasser (albeit for different reasons) and I
encouraged him to send a note on the matter to Nature. (The fact
that this aspect is opposed to Dirac’s hole theory only speaks for
it. For experience shows that positive and negative charge do not
act exactly the same and I do not like at all moving this asymme-
try into the initial state of the world, as Dirac does). (Letter to
Peierls, 22 May 1933, translation by Alexander Blum in personal
correspondence, full letter in [56], pp. 163-165.)
Note that finding an explanation that would preserve both the conser-
vation laws and the empirically established symmetry principle led Pauli to
a differential interpretation of the discovery experiments. Being immersed
in problems regarding the structure of the atomic nucleus, Pauli briefly en-
tertained the Bose interpretation of the experimental particle.41 The Bose-
positron hypothesis, whilst making the proton a composite particle, would
also restore the elementarity of the neutron, a contentious issue at the time.
However, more importantly, this hypothesis would help clear away some of
the mysteries concerning β−decay: if the proton were to decay into a neutron
and a Bose-positron the conservation of angular momentum would also be re-
stored.42 It is plausible to suggest that Pauli’s opposition to Dirac’s positron
41Pauli expresses his preference for a Bose-positron in a letter to Peierls dated 22 May
1933, as well as in a letter to Heisenberg dated 16 June 1933. A further letter to Heisen-
berg, dated 14 July 1933, marks the abandonment of the Bose-positron hypothesis, but is
particularly instructive in explaining the the different problems and advantages associated
with the Bose-positron. For the full letters see [56].
42Pauli’s brief preference for the Bose-positron, along with the reasons and implications
of this preference are discussed in [20], pp 172 -173, [31], pp. 133-134, see also fn. 78, and
[2], p. 257. Note that as Darrigol mentions, the idea of building the “nuclei with neutrons
and Bose positrons rather than with protons and neutrons” was still supported by Francis
Perrin in September 1933, though he was convinced by others to abandon it. The point
here is that such suggestions did not seem impossible in the context of rapid changes and
discoveries characteristic of crystallisation.
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was due to the fact that it did not shed light on either the nuclear puzzles
or β − decay. To Pauli, the possibility of the experimental particle obeying
Bose-Einstein statistics was appealing for yet another reason: it supported his
own hypothesis about a new kind of particle that “carries out” the missing
energy in β− decay: his neutrino might be a combination of a Bose-positron
and an electron and this in turn would help maintain conservation of energy
as well as solving the spin statistics anomalies. In this connection, he tells
Peierls, that,
When nuclear physics is concerned, I would again believe in the
conservation laws - not only those of energy, momentum (and of
course charge), but also of angular momentum and the symmetry
characteristic (Bose or Fermi) of the whole system. As my early
conjecture of the existence of “neutrinos” and its emission via
beta-decay has been strengthened by the discovery of the positive
electron. (Letter to Peierls, 22 May 1933, translation by Radin
Dardashti in personal correspondence, full letter in [56], pp. 163-
165).
By mid June, Pauli still resisted the association between the discovered
particle and the Dirac Particle, citing similar reasons as he gave to Peierls,
in a letter to Heisenberg:
I do not believe in hole theory, because I wish to have an asym-
metry between positive and negative charge in the laws of nature
(it does not satisfy me to move the empirically observed asym-
metry into the initial state of the world). Elsasser has voiced the
hypothesis that the positive electrons might obey Bose statistics
and have spin 0 or 1. I do not think that this can be excluded.
Indeed, the fact that this would cause difficulties for Dirac’s the-
ory makes me like this hypothesis’. (Letter to Heisenberg, 16 June
1933, translation by Alexander Blum in personal correspondence,
full letter in [56], p. 169.)
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By mid July 1933, Pauli gave up the Bose-positron idea, but he was still
reluctant to equate the experimental particle with Dirac’s theoretical predic-
tion. It is worth noting that despite an intense interest in Dirac’s equation
and the hole theory, Pauli had misgivings about both from the beginning.43
As Blum notes, “[w]hat bothered him most was the fact that it appeared
to place the asymmetry between positive and negative charge in the initial
conditions (i.e., the occupied negative energy states) rather than in the phys-
ical laws [...]” ([32], p. 550). From Pauli’ viewpoint, potential violations to
conservation laws in β-decay also spoke against Dirac’s positron, as did the
formalism of the hole theory, for which Pauli used the “deprecatory term
‘subtraction physics’” ([58]).
This succession of events suggests that Pauli’s attitude, far from being due
to prejudice against new particles, was instead shaped by carefully weighing
his background assumptions against viable solutions to pressing conceptual
and empirical problems in a period of crystallisation. Pauli did not believe in
Dirac’s anti-electron because the anti-electron was inherently tied to the hole
theory, a theory that although he preoccupied himself with for a few years
(even after the positron’s authentication),44 he opposed it most of the time.
And, he resisted Blackett’s interpretation of the experimental results because
it did not lead to viable solutions to the pressing conceptual and empirical
problems he wished solved. Thus Pauli’s reluctance, was not to one particle,
but to two particles.
Pauli’s views exerted a certain influence in the community, since physi-
cists “always benefitted by Pauli’s comments even if disagreement could tem-
porarily prevail”, but as Bohr notes, “if he felt he had to change his views,
he admitted it most gracefully, and accordingly it was a great comfort when
43Blum, in particular, stresses this point in connection to symmetry violations: “The
most prominent critic of the Dirac equation, and of hole theory in particular, was Pauli.
He was unsatisfied with hole theory from the start” ([32], p. 550).
44Pauli, in collaboration with his assistant at the time, Victor Weisskopf, wrote an
‘anti-Dirac’ paper [59], which was meant to avoid Dirac’s ‘subtraction physics’.
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new developments met with his approval”.45 Pauli’s change of heart regarding
the positron, like his intermittent opposition to the positron throughout 1933,
can be accounted for by understanding his perspective during crystallisation,
in particular the problems he cared to solve and the theoretical assumptions
he upheld. Bohr’s remark only serves to provide additional support to the
fact that Pauli’s attitude was shaped by a concern with solutions to prob-
lems and not by prejudice or ‘personal animosity’. Pauli’s biographer ponders
“[w]hy this personal animosity towards an abstract matter [i.e., Dirac’s hole
theory], one may ask, particularly since this theory was such a success in
explaining the properties of the spinning electron? This is a difficult question
to answer, even when considering that Pauli liked shocking language in his
private statements” [54], p. 295. As shown, Pauli’s attitude was neither due
to personal animosity nor exceedingly mysterious or difficult to account for.
By having examined the perspectives of Pauli and Bohr throughout 1933
we have gleaned some of the factors that prompted their reluctance to first,
accept the positron as a new particle of matter; and second, to resist the
equation of the Dirac particle with the experimental particle. Both Bohr and
Pauli changed their attitude towards the positron by the end of 1933. Their
changing perspectives, occasioned by certain developments prior to the 7th
Solvay Conference, as well as by the discussions during the conference, have
not yet been investigated. In the following section, the unfolding of the 7th
Solvay Conference is therefore traced to glean further insights of Bohr’s and
Pauli’s changing perspectives.
6. Authentication
Abraham Pais claims that “the positron theory as a serious discipline
started in October 1933 with Dirac’s address to the 7th Solvay Conference”
([33], p. 98), whilst Bohr opens his Solvay remarks by praising “[t]he wonder-
ful confirmation which Dirac’s theory of the electron has received through the
45See Bohr’s Foreword to the Pauli Memorial volume, [55], p. 3.
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discovery of the positron” ([52], p. 183). Both suggest that the long authen-
tication processes of the positron ended at the Solvay conference. Yet despite
Bohr’s remarks and Pais’ statement, the discussions during the Solvay con-
ference were still against the identification of the experiments with Dirac’s
theoretical prediction. It is more accurate to suggest that the necessary de-
velopments that led to the protracted equation of Dirac’s prediction of the
positron with the experimental positron were indeed set in motion at the
Solvay Conference, so in a sense the discussions did mark the ‘the beginning
of the positron as a serious discipline’. But it would be misleading, despite
Bohr’s pronouncement, to take the Solvay Conference as the locus of the
positron’s authentication. Bohr’s and Pauli’s interventions in connection to
the positron, far from taking the experiments to confirm Dirac’s prediction,
suggested the contrary. They were both still sceptical of the identification of
Dirac’s theoretical prediction to the experimental particle, as will be shown
below. It will be suggested, however, that developments with regard to the
structure of the nucleus and the β-decay problem forced Bohr and Pauli to
further rethink some of their previous assumptions and to reevaluate their
stance towards the positron.
The 7th Solvay Conference on the “Structure and properties of the atomic
nucleus” which took place between October 22nd – October 29th 1933, in
Bruxelles brought together some of the most influential physicists at the time,
many of which were involved in one way or another in the positron story. As
the title of the conference indicates, the main discussions revolved around the
structure of the atomic nucleus with remarks on the positron occasionally
looming in reports and in the discussions. In fact, Dirac’s own report was
a late addition to the conference’s agenda, mainly due to an intervention of
Pauli’s.46 Whilst he was an ardent critic of the hole theory, Pauli thought
that a “report on the development of the hole theory and its relationship with
46The quote from Pauli’s letter to Paul Langevin is reproduced in [3], p. 146. See also
[2] and [4] for reports on the 7th Solvay conference.
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the positive electron” (Pauli, letter to Langevin, cited in [3], p. 146), shorter
and as a supplement to Heisenberg’s report, would be most desirable and
also useful for “the general discussion of the theory of nuclei” (id., 146). The
fact that Dirac was only invited due to Pauli’s intervention, already suggests
that little was hoped to be gained from Dirac’s theory of holes in regard to
the positron.
The conference begun with Langevin’s opening remarks, followed by Cock-
croft’s report on the disintegration of elements by accelerated protons, Chad-
wick’s report touching on the neutron discovery, and the Joliot-Curries’ re-
port on artificial radioactivity ([60], ch. 8, [61]). Whilst Chadwick’s report
contributes towards ‘expelling’ the electrons from the nucleus,47 the Joliot-
Curries’ report offers further evidence of pair production, and thus of the
existence of positrons.
Dirac’s report at the Solvay conference was preceded by a favourable dis-
cussion by Blackett on the positive electron and its properties. Blackett’s
report drew mainly from the experimental data and he “tactfully [...] dis-
cussed pair creation and annihilation in terms of the conservation of charge
and energy alone” ([4], p. 107). Whilst mostly favourable to Dirac, Blackett
is fairly cautious in straightforwardly asserting that Dirac’s theory has been
conclusively confirmed by the experiments as can be seen from his remark:
Dirac’s theory of the electron predicted particles with exactly the
same properties, and so, the experiments provide some powerful
support to the essential correctness of Dirac’s theory. (author’s
translation from Solvay Report)48
Despite Blackett’s confidence in Dirac’s theory, a rather intense opposition
47Brown and Rechenberg [21] point out that, in places, Chadwick’s report still suggests
a composite neutron.
48La the´orie de l’e´lectron de Dirac avait pre´dit l’existence de particules ayant exactement
ces meˆmes proprie´te´s, de sorte que les re´sultats de l’expe´rience apportent un puissant appui
en faveur de l’exactitude de la the´orie de Dirac quant a` son essence ([61], p. 172).
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to establishing a strong link between the hole theory and the experiments on
the positive electron is apparent in the discussions. In particular, Blackett’s
arguments regarding the positive electron’s spin, which would decisively show
that the experimental particle is a Fermi-Dirac particle and hence should be
equated with Dirac’s prediction, were received with hostility by both Bohr
and Pauli as their comments clearly suggest:
[Bohr] It is of utmost importance to learn, as Monsieur Blackett
learns, to draw as many conclusions as possible from experiments
on positive electrons, without having to appeal to Dirac’s theory.
I believe that the conclusion regarding charge is justified, but
the conclusion regarding spin seems to me less certain. (author’s
translation from Solvay Report)49
[Pauli] As opposed to what Monsieur Bohr thinks, I think that
Monsieur Blackett’s conclusion regarding the charge of the posi-
tive electron could not in any way be considered as more certain
than his conclusion regarding its spin. (author’s translation from
Solvay Report)50
It is important to note that “at the Solvay congress of 1933 Bohr still
resisted the evidence vindicating Dirac’s anti-electron and contemplated the
49“Il est de la plus haute importance d’essayer, comme le fait M. Blackett, de tirer des
conclusions aussi nombreuses que possible d’experie´nces sur les e´lectrons positifs, sans
devoir recourir a` la the´orie de Dirac. Je pense que la conclusion relative a` la charge est
juste, mais celle concernant le spin me semble moins certaine. En re´alite´, comme c’est la
pre´sence du champ nucle´aire qui permet au quantum de lumie`re incident de produire les
deux particules, il n’st pas du tout exclu que le noyau prenne part au me´canisme de la
conservation du moment angulaire” (Bohr’s comment to Blackett’s report at the Solvay
Conference (id.))
50“Contrairement a` ce que pense M. Bohr, je suis d’avis que la conclusion de M. Blackett
concernant la charge de l’e´lectron positif ne saurait en aucune fac¸on eˆtre conside´re´e comme
plus certain que celle concernant son spin” (Pauli’s comment to Blackett’s report at the
Solvay Conference (id.)).
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possibility that the positron’s spin would differ from one half” ([2], p. 256).
In the discussions following Blackett’s report on the positive electron, it is
evident that Bohr and Pauli equally, pressed Blackett for details on how
the numerous conclusions with regard to the properties of the experimental
particle could be derived without appealing to Dirac’s hole theory. Bohr, in
particular, was still doubtful of the physical interpretation of spin, especially
because such a property did not make much sense in the classical theory.
For different reasons, Pauli resisted Blackett’s arguments and in particular
the suggestion that the experiments ought to be taken as a confirmation of
Dirac’s hole theory.
Blackett’s Solvay report failed to offer a definite theoretical identity to
the positive electron. His proposed interpretation of the experimental results
was not unquestioningly received. Besides Bohr and Pauli, Rutherford was
also dissatisfied with the interpretation of the experiments. Whilst praising
Blackett’s experimental work, he expressed his concern with regard to the
possibility that the experiments were influenced by Dirac’s theory and he
confessed that it would have been desirable to interpret the experiments with-
out appeal to a preexisting theory.51 More questions and comments followed,
some leading to lengthy discussions and raising more suspicion with regard
to the interpretation of the experimental results. In particular, a comment
of Perrin’s regarding the conservation of energy in the process of producing
positrons stirred even more dissatisfaction from Bohr and Pauli.
Blackett, however, like Ire`ne Curie, also reported on pair production, with
Blackett arguing that the production of a positive electron is not a nuclear
phenomena, and hence pairs are created outside the nucleus (cf. [61], pp. 170
51“Il me semble qu’a` certains re´gards il est regrettable que nous ayons eu une the´orie
de l’e´lectron positif avant le de´but des expe´riences. M. Blackett a fait son possible pour
ne pas se laisser influencer par la the´orie, mais la fac¸on d’envisager les re´sultats doit
ine´vitablement eˆtre influence´e par la the´orie e´tait venue apre`s l’e´tablissement expe´rimental
des faits” (Rutherford, comment to Blackett’s report on the positive electron, in [61], p.
178).
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- 171). Blackett’s hypothesis is reinforced by one of Lise Meitner’s interven-
tions in which she supports the idea that “positrons, unlike beta electrons,
did not emerge from the nucleus” ([23], p. 101),52 an idea embraced by Pauli,
but opposed by Bohr. The idea that positron and electron pairs were pro-
duced outside the nucleus strengthened an already existing, though not pre-
dominant, suggestion according to which the electron was not a component
of the nucleus. Most importantly, though, it lent further support to Dirac’s
prediction, as Dirac had already envisaged in his 1931 paper ‘the creation
simultaneously of an electron and anti-electron’. Pair production, had yet
other implications not only in connection to the structure of the nucleus,
which would no longer contain electrons, but also in connection to β−decay.
The missing energy in β − decay could be attributed to the neutrino, a hy-
pothesis favoured by Pauli, though not by Bohr.
Dirac’s own report, entitled “Theory of the Positron”, followed Blackett’s
report. Rather surprisingly, Dirac’s report did not perpetuate the discussion
about positive electrons and their properties. Most questions were in con-
nection to internal problems of the hole theory, or with regard to certain
calculations which Dirac had not yet made. One of Bohr’s comments in par-
ticular, showcases once again, however, his hostile attitude towards the hole
theory. In this comment, Bohr questions the very possibility that, at least
some of the consequences of Dirac’s hole theory will ever be vindicated by
experiments.53
Bohr’s attitude changes dramatically towards the end of the discussions;
he starts his general remarks by praising “[t]he wonderful confirmation which
Dirac’s theory of the electron has received through the discovery of the
positron” ([52], p. 183). This change of heart, though likely prompted by the
discussions, may have, in fact, occurred after the Solvay Conference as “the
52For Meitner’s comment, see [61], pp. 175 - 176.
53“Je me demande si, en somme, une ve´rification expe´rimentale de ces conse´quences
de la the´orie des lacunes doit eˆtre regarde´e comme possible ou non”, Bohr’s comment to
Dirac’s Solvay report, in [61], p. 178).
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published proceedings were in the making for at least 4 months after Solvay’s
guests left their rooms at the Hoˆtel Me´tropole, even though the discussions
following the reports were printed as if they were direct transcriptions, and
preserved a casual tone” ([4], p. 106). Moreover, “[i]n February 1934 speak-
ers were sent the galley proofs and gave the final touches to their interven-
tions – 4 months after the event, then as now not a negligible time gap in
physics” ([4], p. 107). Short of a miraculous conversion to the Dirac particle,
Roque´ attributes Bohr’s and Pauli’s changing attitudes to “theoretical and
experimental practices employed in its manufacture, and then legitimated by
discovery accounts that emphasised the coherence of Dirac, Anderson, and
Blackett and Occhialini’s work” ([4], p. 115). However, it is equally likely that
it was not only “manufacture and coherence efforts” that led to the authen-
tication of the positron. Insofar as Bohr and Pauli are concerned negotiating
the contribution of the positron to the problems they wished to solve, as well
as the reevaluation of certain assumptions and of pending problems and solu-
tions against the post Solvay Conference background, can be said to equally
define their changing attitudes towards the positron.
The Solvay Conference marked the abandonment of certain prior assump-
tions and welcomed the arrival of new ones. During the discussions of the
Solvay Conference, it became clear that electrons cannot be confined within
the nucleus and hence the assumption that the nucleus was constituted by
a proton and an electron was belatedly abandoned. In light of experimental
evidence attesting the existence of the positrons, as well as the discovery
of Chadwick’s neutron, the belief that there are only two elementary con-
stituents of matter, was also abandoned. Some things stayed the same, such
as the energy conservation principle, whilst others were enthusiastically re-
ceived. For example, the “newly discovered process of electron positron cre-
ation” ([2], p. 261) led to fruitful new hypothesis regarding β − decay and
nuclear constitution whilst Pauli’s neutrino idea gained ground and was later
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fruitfully exploited by Fermi.54 All these results of the reports and discussions
of the Solvay Conference can be taken to support the suggestion that Bohr’s
and Pauli’s conversion to the Dirac particle was not a miraculous conver-
sion, but instead stemmed from a reevaluation of their relevant perspectives.
Both Bohr and Pauli embraced the mechanism of pair production and with it
they accepted the existence of Dirac’s positron. Both also subscribed to the
new structure of the nucleus without the electron as a permanent inhabitant,
and welcomed the rapid proliferation of (some) new particles. Both scientists
abandoned some of their theoretical commitments and adopted new ones. All
these changes mark rational shifts in the epistemic attitudes of unprejudiced
scientists, who resisted the authentication of the positron for good epistemic
reasons.55 Whilst it may be cautious not to take the Solvay Conference as
the very final step in the authentication of the positron, the reports and
discussions certainly set in motion the relevant steps towards welcoming the
positron as a new particle of matter.
7. Concluding Remarks
The historical case study of the positron is both a blessing and a curse.
The short, yet fascinating, early history of the positron has already lent itself
to a number of philosophically rich analyses, in particular on the complex na-
ture of experiments [4] and the structure of novel predictions [5]. Here we have
sought to glean further insights regarding the authentication of the positron.
This is the blessing. The curse, as one might have guessed, resides, amongst
other things, in the precarious nature of any final pronouncements as re-
54Soon after the Solvay Conference Fermi formulated a theory of β−decay for which he
sought publication in Nature. His note was not accepted byNature due to its speculative
character so it was instead published in La Ricerca Scientifica towards the and of December
1933.
55It is plausible to understand these shifts in terms of rational changes in the credences a
scientist assigns to relevant theoretical hypotheses. I am indebted to an anonymous referee
for pointing this out.
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gards physicists’ perspectives towards authentication during crystallisation.
Barring final pronouncements, it was shown, however, that the physicists’ at-
titudes towards the authentication of the positron are neither mystifying nor
based upon dogmatic conservatism, but indeed that their attitudes are both
reasonable and perfectly explicable if seen in the context of crystallisation.
All scientific developments, not least the authentication of a new par-
ticle, take place within the historical context of a research tradition, and
are viewed by the scientists of the day from a range of perspectives. When
the research tradition in question is within a period of crystallisation, where
basic concepts are being reevaluated, scientists with different perspectives
may respond differentially to the same empirical knowledge, and this in turn
may serve to make any process of authentication more fraught. Recognising
this general pattern, which is well illustrated by the present discussion of
the case of the positron, can help us understand the causes of certain types
of scientific disagreements, and in doing so refine our narratives of scientific
discovery in a manner more sensitive to both the peculiarities of the context
and the diverse perspectives of the cast.
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